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Abstract 
This thesis presents an analysis of the Norwegian and Dutch electricity trade and differences 
in outcome between the explicit and the implicit market mechanism on NorNed. The price 
difference between Norway and the Netherlands is used to estimate the possible revenues 
from an implicit auction, had it taken place at the same time as the explicit. The difference in 
revenues turns out to be 23 million Euros from May 2008 until January 2011. Ramping 
restrictions that help ensure system security and amounts to 5 million Euros in the same 
period. Even though the losses attributed to the explicit market mechanism is overestimated 
as ramping is included, the introduction of the implicit auction on NorNed in January 2011 
will improve efficiency considerably.  
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1. Introduction 
In May 2008 NorNed, a 700 MW transmission cable between Norway and the Netherlands, 
became operative. Reaching from Feda in Norway to Eemshaven in the Netherlands, it was 
the longest subsea electricity cable when it was built with a total length of 580 km. The 
NorNed cable is a joint initiative between the Norwegian and the Dutch Transmission 
System Operators (TSOs)
1
, Statnett and TenneT, where costs and revenues are shared 
equally. After years on the planning board, and three years of construction, NorNed opened 
for trade on May 6
th 
2008.  
In Norwegian media there has been a lot of focus on the development of new 
interconnectors
2
 between Norway and the European Continent. The potential profitability of 
such venture is to a large extent based upon the differences between the trading markets, for 
example differences in costs of energy, flexibility and the supply of energy.   
Many factors also indicate even further benefits of trade in the future. For example the effect 
of climate change is predicted to have significant impact on the Norwegian electricity 
market, where both temperature and the amount of precipitation are expected to increase
3
. 
An increase in temperature will lower consumption of electricity for heating, and an increase 
in precipitation will lead to more water in the reservoirs that can be used for electricity 
production. Furthermore, Norway and Sweden have committed to develop 13.2 TWh each of 
renewable electricity by 2020 through the common green electricity certificate market (OED, 
2010). Together with increasing energy efficiency, it is therefore likely that Norway will 
have a substantial electricity surplus in the future that can be exported, if the necessary 
infrastructure (i.e. interconnectors) is in place. 
The efficiency of existing interconnectors has been an important aspect of the debate. The 
choice of market mechanism also influences efficiency through the capacity allocation and 
                                                 
1 A TSO has the overall responsibility of coordination and operation of the power system, including grid stability and 
reliability.  
2 The term interconnector is used in accordance with existing literature, indicating a transmission line that crosses a national 
border thus connecting national transmission systems. (European Commission, 2003) 
3 One such model is RegClim, a coordinated research program developing scenarios for climate change from global 
warming in the Nordic region, the surrounding seas, and parts of the Arctic. For further information on RegClim and the 
results from their research, please see http://regclim.met.no/ 
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profitability of the cables. For example, Bente Hagem, Statnett’s Executive Vice President in 
charge of the Commercial Division, stated that the Norwegian and Dutch consumers had lost 
roughly 30 million Euros due to the explicit auction market mechanism that had been used 
on NorNed. In addition, the electricity flowed in the “wrong” direction 10% of the time 
(Teknisk Ukeblad, 2011). Since then, a new market mechanism – implicit auction – has been 
introduced on NorNed.  
In this thesis I will analyse differences between the explicit and implicit auctions on NorNed 
and the implications of the ramping restrictions imposed by Nordic TSOs. The main focus is 
on the efficiency and mechanisms of short-term trade, i.e. in the day-ahead trade of 
electricity
4
. This also sheds light upon the importance of balancing markets and the necessity 
of ramping restrictions to ensure system security. The Nordic electricity market is heavily 
integrated, but the analysis will focus on Norway to the extent this is possible.   
Statnett has kindly provided a dataset of the electricity trade on NorNed from May 12
th
 2008 
until January 12
th
 2011, i.e. the period of explicit auction. However, the dataset is somewhat 
incomplete, as some prices and transfer capacities are missing. In addition there has been 
some dislodgment between the hour of bought capacity and the hour of physical flow. I have 
filled in the prices and capacities where I have found them to be missing, and corrected the 
dislodgements, but with 23,424 observations and the late discovery of this, there will be 
more corrections to be made.  At best the conclusions drawn from the dataset are therefore 
indicative, and cannot be taken to be exact numbers.  
For the implicit auction, I have used data from January 13
th
 2011 until April 19
th
 2011, when 
an error on the NorNed cable shut down the electricity trade between Norway and the 
Netherlands until June 5
th
 2011. The data for implicit auction is collected from the European 
Market Coupling Company (EMCC)
5
, as well as the Nord Pool Spot
6
 web pages.  
                                                 
4 There is no intra-day trade on NorNed yet, but implementation is being considered. NVE, the Norwegian regulator, 
commissioned a report from Econ Pöyry about the effects of intraday trade on NorNed, available at 
http://www.nve.no/global/kraftmarked/analyser/r-2011-
005%20cse%20effects%20of%20intraday%20trade%20on%20norned.pdf  
5 EMCC: http://www.marketcoupling.com/  
6 Nord Pool Spot: http://www.nordpoolspot.com/  
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Chapter 2 introduces the electricity markets in Norway and the Netherlands, while chapter 3 
focuses on the basis for trade between them, as well as the technical limitation of trade. 
Chapter 4 focuses on how the trade of electricity has taken place between the two countries. 
The general aspects of the two market mechanisms are introduced in chapter 5, while the 
specifics relating to NorNed is covered in chapter 6. The main differences between the 
explicit and implicit auction for NorNed are comment upon in chapter 7. In chapter 8 the 
differences are aggregated to show the difference in revenue under the two market 
mechanisms and the effect of ramping restrictions. Alternatives to ramping are also 
mentioned. Chapter 9 presents some concluding remarks on the topic.  
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2. The Norwegian and Dutch electricity markets 
As mentioned in the introduction, trade takes advantage of the difference between markets to 
create profits. This chapter summarises the most important factors of the Norwegian and 
Dutch electricity markets that are relevant for trade between them.  
2.1 The Norwegian electricity market 
2.1.1 The Norwegian production system 
The vast majority of Norwegian electricity is based on hydropower. In 2009 as much as 
95.7% of the electricity production came from hydropower, 3.6% from thermal and 0.7% 
from wind power (SSB, 2011). The share of wind power is expected to increase in the future 
as more capacity is built out, but will still remain a minor contributor in the Norwegian 
electricity system
7
.  
The high share of hydropower makes the Norwegian electricity production extremely 
flexible as production can quickly be altered at low cost. As the use of intermittent wind 
power in electricity production increases, this quality becomes ever more important to 
counterbalance wind fluctuations and thus balance the electricity system.  
A big disadvantage with hydropower is that the production varies from year to year due to 
variation in the annual precipitation. Norway produced almost 132 TWh in 2009, and 
consumed 123 TWh (SSB, 2011). The difference between consumption and production was 
exported.  
Norway has traditionally been a net exporter of electricity. However, by the beginning of the 
new century the situation had changed due to continued growth in the electricity 
consumption and little investment in development of new generation capabilities post the 
liberalisation of the electricity market.  
                                                 
7 Licences have already been granted to wind power projects with a combined capacity of 9163 GWh, while projects with a 
combined capacity of 64 655 GWh are currently under consideration for licence (NVE). In comparison the expected annual 
production from existing hydropower plants today is 122.7 TWh (NVE, 2010).  
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In a cold climate where much of the heating demand is covered by electricity, the 
consumption of electricity varies with the temperature. In cold years with little precipitation, 
production can presently be insufficient to cover consumption, making the Norwegian 
electricity system dependent on import from other countries. In the last decade electricity 
production from hydropower has varied from 142 TWh in 2000 to 106 TWh in 2003. The 
resulting fluctuations in import and export are shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 Net exchange of electricity 2008-2009 in GWh 
 
    (SSB, 2011) 
 
The flexibility of hydropower in combination with the annual inflow variations into the 
production system creates an opportunity to trade with other countries. However, this 
requires interconnectors.  
 
2.1.2 Interconnectors and trade 
The Norwegian electricity market is connected to Sweden, Denmark, Russia, and Finland in 
addition to the Netherlands. The capacity on NorNed corresponds to roughly 15 percent of 
Norway’s total import capacity, but most of the exchange in 2009 (53 percent) takes place 
with Sweden (NVE, 2011). The transfer capacities to Finland and Russia are small, 
approximately 100 MW and 50 MW respectively, which limit the direct power exchange. 
The cross-border transfer capacities are shown in Figure 2 (rounded to nearest 50 MW), 
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where the two numbers for Sweden indicate different capacity for import and export 
respectively.  
Figure 2 Capacity of existing Norwegian interconnections  
 (Nord Pool Spot, 2011) 
To supplement the existing interconnectors there are also plans to extend the existing grid
8
.  
 A new cable to Denmark (Skagerrak 4) with a capacity of 700 MW is expected to be 
in place by 2014.  
 A cable to England with a capacity of 1400 MW is planned to be operational by 
2017-2020.  
 A 1400 MW cable between Norway and Germany, planned operational in 2016-2018 
 A second cable to the Netherlands (NorNed 2) with a capacity of 700 MW by 2015-
2016 
 
Electricity trade is organised in different ways according to the agreements between Norway 
and the other country. There is a general development towards more integration of the 
electricity markets in Europe, from bilateral agreements to auctions, and from explicit 
auctions to implicit auctions, such as NorNed. The trading arrangement on NorNed will be 
further elaborated in chapter 6. In an explicit auction, transmission capacity and price is set 
in two different markets, i.e. the transfer capacity is explicitly set. In implicit auction the 
                                                 
8 For further details, please see http://www.statnett.no/no/Prosjekter/  
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transmission capacity is implicitly set at the same time as the electricity price is set in a 
market (Hammer, 2007). The details will be elaborated in chapter 5.  
For all practical purposes the cable to Russia is used to import electricity. It is operated 
based on bilateral agreements where Statnett facilitates the transfer of electricity, but the 
buyers purchase electricity directly from the power plant in Boris Gleb. The buyers can then 
choose whether or not to include the imported electricity in Nord Pool Spot or to sell it over-
the-counter (OTC) (Granli, 2011). Due to the very limited capacity on the cable, the trading 
arrangement is unlikely to be revised.  
The majority of the electricity trade to and from Norway is handled through Nord Pool 
Spot
9
, a common electricity market with Denmark, Finland and Sweden. For all 
interconnectors between these countries, physical trade is handled by means of implicit 
auction through Elspot.  
In the Elspot market, hourly electricity contracts are traded on a daily basis with delivery 
within the next day’s 24 hour period. The bids for purchase or sale of hourly contracts come 
in three different types: hourly, block and flexible bids.  
 In an hourly bid the participant selects a range of price steps for which individual 
bids are made. Based on the price ranges, Nord Pool Spot makes a linear 
interpolation of volumes between each adjacent pair of submitted price steps.  
 A Block bid is an aggregated bid with fixed price and volume over several 
consecutive hours and is offered to the market with an “all or nothing” condition for 
all the hours within the block. One of the main advantages of the block bid is seen 
where the cost of starting and stopping electricity production is high.   
 A flexible hourly bid is a sales bid for a single hour with a fixed price and volume. 
Which hours is not specified, but the bid will be accepted in the hour with the highest 
price above the bid price limit. The idea is that large, power intensive consumers can 
regulate their activities so that they can sell power back to the market in peak hours.  
                                                 
9 Nord Pool Spot is the largest market place for electrical energy in the world with 288TWh traded in 2009 and a market 
share of 72% of total consumption of electricity in the Nordic market (Nord Pool Spot, 2009). It offers both day-ahead 
(elspot) and intraday markets (elbas).  
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The price of electricity is calculated on basis of an implicit auction where supply and 
demand from all market participants is matched. In addition, capacity restraints on power 
flow are implicitly taken into consideration, as the exchange between bidding areas cannot 
exceed the transmission capacities given by the TSOs. Within-area congestion is dealt with 
by counter-trade purchases and special regulation, whereas at the interconnectors between 
the Nordic countries and within Norway, price mechanisms are used to relieve bottlenecks. 
The bidding areas can then become separate price areas if the power flow between bid areas 
exceed capacity set by the TSOs (Nord Pool Spot, 2009). 
2.2 The Dutch electricity market 
2.2.1 The Dutch electricity production 
The Dutch electricity production is based on thermal production. Thermal production 
covered 85.5 percent of the Dutch electricity production in 2008, where natural gas and coal 
are the most significant contributors. Figure 3 shows the breakdown of electricity production 
by energy source for 2008.  
Figure 3 The Dutch electricity production per energy source in 2008 
 
  (Statistics Netherlands, 2011) 
 
The price of fossil fuels, such as natural gas and coal, therefore plays a significant role in 
determining the price of electricity. Contrary to Norway with large annual variation in 
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production due to variation in precipitation, the Dutch production is more predictable and 
more stable from year to year. A thermal production system is characterised by stable 
production as it is costly to regulate up and down production
10
. As development of 
intermittent wind power is marked as a method to achieve the Netherlands goal of 14 percent 
renewable by 2020 (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment), this will require more 
balancing power from the TSO.  
The Dutch electricity production amounted to 114 TWh in 2009, while consumption was 
104 TWh (Eurostat, 2011). The Netherlands is a net importer of electricity. However, as 
Figure 4 shows, the gap between imports and exports has decreased the last years. There has 
been an increase in the amount of electricity exported in the last decennium, while imports 
have fallen slightly. In 2009, the Netherlands exported 10.6 TWh, while imported 15.5 TWh. 
At the same time, cross-border connections have increased possibilities for trade.  
Figure 4 Net import of electricity to the Netherlands 2001-2009 in GWh 
 
                     (Eurostat, 2011) 
                                                 
10 Within the group of thermal production systems, natural gas and coal plants are cheaper to regulate up and down than for 
example a nuclear plant, but compared to hydropower, the cost is significantly higher. I will therefore treat thermal plants 
under one group.  
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2.2.2 Interconnectors and trade 
The Netherlands is connected to Germany and Belgium by five high voltage alternating 
current cross-border connections. Two of these connections go to Belgium with a total 
capacity of 1401 MW, while the three connections to Germany have a combined capacity of 
2449 MW (Smit, 2011). BritNed with a capacity of 1000 MW became operational in April 
2011, thus connecting the Netherlands to Great Britain. In addition, the Netherlands is 
connection to Norway by NorNed. The cross-border capacities are shown in Figure 5, 
rounded to the nearest 50 MW. 
Figure 5 Capacity of existing Dutch interconnections 
 (Smit, 2011) 
In addition, the following cables are planned
11
: 
 COBRA-cable: Netherland-Denmark: 700 MW by 2016  
 NorNed 2: 700 MW by 2016-2018 
 Another connection to Germany by 2013-2016 
 
Since 2006 APX, the Dutch electricity exchange, has been coupled with Powernext (France) 
and Belpex (Belgium), replacing explicit auction of capacity on the interconnectors. Since 
                                                 
11 For further details, please see http://www.tennet.org/english/projects/index.aspx  
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then, Germany and Luxembourg have joined, resulting in a market coupling solution 
between five countries in what is called the Central Western European (CWE).  
A common auction house – Capacity Allocation Service Company, CASC – has been 
established to coordinate the cross-border trade within CWE
12
. CASC also offers explicit 
trade of transfer capacity on a monthly and yearly basis, but this falls outside the scope of 
this thesis. The allocation of daily cross-border capacities is done by the CWE Market 
Coupling that simultaneously achieve an implicit allocation of physical daily transmission 
rights and a clearing of electricity bids. First, the market participants submit bids to their 
local power exchange. The TSOs provide the transfer capacities and the power exchanges 
provide the bids for electricity to the common auction house. This information is then fed 
into the COSMOS algorithm
13
 which simultaneously determines the optimal transmission 
across the borders and the prices. As market prices and schedules of the connected markets 
are set simultaneously, the transmission capacity is implicitly auctioned and the implicit cost 
of the transmission capacity is settled by the price difference between the two markets 
(Djabili, Hoeksema, & Langer, 2010).  
The day-ahead transfer capacity on BritNed is allocated through implicit auction. The 
auction is facilitated by the power exchanges APX-ENDEX Power NL and APX-ENDEX 
UK based on a day-ahead auction and is very similar to CWE implicit auction. There is also 
an explicit auction for monthly and yearly allocation of transfer capacity which falls outside 
the scope of this thesis
14
.  
The market mechanism on NorNed is implicit through the auction house EMCC – European 
Market Coupling Company. This will further elaborated in section 6.2. 
 
                                                 
12 Please see http://www.casc.eu/en for further details.  
13 For further details on the COSMOS algorithm, please see 
http://www.belpex.be/uploads/Market_Coupling/COSMOS_public_description.pdf  
14 For futher details, please see https://www.britned.com/Pages/default.aspx  
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3. Trade and electricity 
The basic trade theory imply importing when the domestic price is higher than the price of 
the good abroad and export when domestic price is lower than the price abroad, thus taking 
advantage of the differences in production systems between countries to mutually increase 
benefit for both countries (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2005). This relates as well to electricity as 
to other tradable goods (Andersen & Sørgard, 1998). 
However, the inherent properties of electricity make electricity trade differ from the trade of 
other goods. For all practical purposes, electricity is the same good no matter where or how 
it has been produced
15
. While the generation and consumption of other goods need to 
balance over time, the balance needs to be instantaneous in the electricity market as 
electricity cannot be stored in large quantities in an economic manner. In addition, 
consumption of electricity varies considerably both over time and across borders. As modern 
society cannot function without electricity, trade can serve as a method to ensure availability 
of electricity, in addition to securing a profit (Wangensteen, 2007).  
3.1 Electricity trade  
As discussed in chapter 2, the nature of hydropower and thermal power lead to different cost 
structures. While a hydropower plant is cheap to regulate up and down, a thermal plant is run 
more efficiently at a steady production, as regulating up and down is significantly more 
costly. Thermal plants also require a large investment to build, which makes it unprofitable 
to build thermal plants only to cover peak consumption. In addition, such plans will have 
high variable production costs (Olje- og energidepartementet, 2003). This leads to varying 
prices in the course of a day in a thermal system. During the night when demand is limited, 
the prices are low and it can be more profitable for the thermal producers to export electricity 
cheaply than to regulate down production for a few hours. During peak hours prices in a 
thermal based system are likely to be higher than prices in a hydropower system which will 
make it profitable for a hydropower producer to export electricity to the thermal system.  
                                                 
15 To simplify, I assume that it does not matter to consumers how the electricity is produced, which makes the willingness 
to pay the same for electricity produced from both thermal power and hydropower. The willingness to pay for “green” 
electricity is therefore not part of this thesis.  
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However, for an electricity system based on hydropower, the question of trade is not simply 
a static problem of importing when the price abroad is lower than the domestic price and 
exporting when the price abroad is higher than the domestic price. It is also a dynamic 
problem as water can be stored in reservoirs for later use. If reservoir levels are low, the 
electricity producers might want to conserve water for peak consumption during winter 
months when the domestic prices will be even higher than the daily peaks in the thermal 
system.  
Førsund (2007) formulates the trade situation between one country based on hydropower, the 
other based on thermal power sources as a socio-economic optimisation problem over two 
periods, including transfer and reservoir capacity restraints: 
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The model maximised social welfare for both countries given a number of restrictions. The 
model assumes zero operating costs for hydropower. The social surplus can therefore be 
simplified to the area beneath the consumer demand function for electricity on price for 
period t,      , as the consumers’ costs are identical to the producers’ profit. For the thermal 
system the same simplification does not hold due to operating costs. The thermal cost 
function,     
     is therefore subtracted from the integral of the demand function   
      to 
yield the social welfare.  
The restrictions are as follows: 
   
  is the consumption of electricity in the hydropower based system at time t which 
is limited by the electricity production from hydropower at time t,   
 , plus the import 
of electricity produced from thermal power at time t,      
   minus the electricity 
produced from hydropower that is exported at time t,     
   
   
   is the consumption of electricity in the thermal based system at time t which is 
limited by the electricity production from thermal sources at time t,   
  , minus the 
quantity that is exported at time t,      
  , plus the quantity of electricity from 
hydropower that is imported at time t,     
   
 The amount of water in the reservoirs at time t,    , cannot be higher than the water 
level the previous time period,     , plus the water inflow,  , minus what has been 
used to produce electricity in period t,   
   
 The water level in the reservoirs at time t cannot be higher than the maximum 
capacity  of the reservoirs,    
 The amount of electricity produced from hydropower that is exported or imported in 
period t,     
  , cannot be higher than the import/export capacity,     . The same goes 
for the amount of electricity produced from thermal power that is imported or 
exported,      
    
 The amount of electricity produced from thermal sources in period t,   
  , cannot be 
higher than the thermal production capacity      
 The consumption (  
    
  ), production (  
    
    and traded quantities (     
       
  ) of 
electricity cannot be negative 
 The time frame of the model (T), the inflow of water into the system (   , the initial 
reservoirs level (   , the maximum water capacity of the reservoirs (   , the 
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import/export capacity (      as well as the thermal production capacity (      are 
given exogenously outside the model, while the reservoir level at a specific point in 
time can vary (               ).  
 
The autarky scenario leaves the hydro based country with the same price in the two periods, 
while the price in the thermal based country in period 1 is lower than in the hydro based 
country, and higher than the hydropower based country in period 2.  
By defining the periods so that period 1 is night-time and period 2 is daytime, this model 
predicts that the hydro based country will import during the night and accumulate more 
water in the reservoirs than in autarky. The consumption at night will also marginally 
increase. The accumulated water in the reservoirs can be used to produce electricity for 
export during daytime, saving the thermal based country from operating the least cost 
effective power plants, but more importantly the hydropower producer earns a profit. The 
price in the thermal based country increases at night. 
In period 2, daytime, the price in the thermal based country is reduced, thereby increasing 
consumption, but not enough to induce development of spare generation capacity. Trade 
hence postpones the building of more capacity in the thermal based country. For the hydro 
based country, price in period 2 is slightly higher than in autarky.  
Overall, both countries benefit from trade, but in different periods. As the export price for 
the hydro based country is higher than the import price, the hydro based country develops a 
trade surplus on the electricity trade, and the thermal based country a trade deficit.  
3.2 Electricty trade between Norway and the Netherlands 
According to the auction rules issued by Statnett and TenneT (2008), the reason behind the 
installation of an interconnector between Norway and the Netherland was its contribution to 
overall security of supply by linking the Dutch and the Norwegian national grids. However, 
it is important to also remember the potential for profit.  
The differences in production methods and consumption patterns mean that the two systems 
to a large extent complement each other. The daily fluctuations in electricity prices in the 
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Netherlands compared to Norway create mutually beneficial trade opportunities. For 
example, consider Figure 6 which shows spot prices at APX and price area 2 at Nord Pool 
Spot (the price area where NorNed is connected to the Norwegian grid) for April 12
th
 2010. 
During peak day time on this day, the APX prices are well above the area 2 Nord Pool Spot 
price, making imports from Norway to Netherlands profitable. During night and off-peak 
daytime, it is profitable to export electricity to Norway. 
Figure 6 Hourly price pattern during a day in Norway (price area 2 at Nord 
Pool Spot) and the Netherlands (APX) April 12th 2010 in Euro/MWh 
 
          (Statnett; EMCC, 2011) 
The explanation behind the stable price of electricity in Norway is that the system is almost 
completely based on hydropower, where the price of electricity is largely based on the water 
value (the opportunity cost of water). In dry years the water value is high due to scarcity of 
water in the reservoirs. In wet years water is more abundant thus contributing to a lower 
opportunity cost and water value. The variable costs related to adjusting power are close to 
zero. Production can therefore rapidly be ramped up and down by increasing water flow 
from reservoir at minimal cost to follow consumption. This is contrary to thermal system 
where the cost of adjusting power can be considerable. 
For Norway, interconnection with other markets therefore means reduced vulnerability to 
variability in inflow variations. The interconnectors provide a possibility to import electricity 
that can reduce the need for large domestic reserve capacity to secure supply of electricity in 
dry years.  This may diminish the price fluctuations that would otherwise have been 
significant (Olje- og energidepartementet, 2008). However, even with the current level of 
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interconnection, the two past dry winters in Norway have significantly increased electricity 
prices.  This will be further discussed in chapter 4. 
The Dutch production on the other hand is based on thermal production, where the price of 
electricity is based not only on the price of gas and coal, which are the main production 
methods, but also on the cost of ramping thermal production system up and down. It is 
expensive to vary production in a thermal system. When there is low demand for electricity, 
only the base load plants are producing, but as demand peaks, plants with higher variable 
costs are put into production. This leads to a steep supply function and high peak prices. 
Prices in non-peak hours for example during the night are much lower, as the cost of shutting 
production completely down and restarting in the morning can be higher than running the 
plant through the night. Since much of the electricity consumption in Norway is used for 
heating, the Norwegian demand for electricity is relatively higher than in the Netherlands 
during the night.  
By interconnecting the Norwegian and the Dutch electricity markets, it is then possible to 
reduce Norwegian hydro-based production at night and import electricity at a lower cost than 
the water value from the Netherlands. Producers in Norway can then choose to save water in 
reservoirs to earn a higher price by exporting to the Netherlands at daytime. Rather than 
meeting demand in peak hours in the Netherlands by starting expensive thermal plants with 
high variable costs, it will be cheaper to import electricity from Norway. Importing 
electricity can therefore increase the supply and reduce the price of electricity in the 
Netherlands. The interconnection can therefore give benefits to both systems. As the prices 
in Norway become sufficiently higher than the marginal cost of thermal production, it will 
become profitable for Dutch producers to export electricity to Norway. Reversely, it will be 
profitable for Norwegian producers to export electricity when the Nord Pool Spot system 
price is lower than the APX spot price in the Netherlands. This will lead to several shifts 
from import to export during the course of 24 hours.  
Note that due to Norwegian seasonal variations, the profits from export and import will vary 
over the year. Available water for production of electricity is not only this year’s 
precipitation but also the water that is stored in reservoirs. On the other hand, the Dutch 
production is quite static, and the price fluctuates intraday rather than between seasons. 
Therefore, the amount of Norwegian electricity available for export as well as the price will 
vary significantly according to the season as well as the amount of water available in the 
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reservoirs. To illustrate, Figure 7 shows the hourly price difference between Norway (price 
area 2) and the Netherlands on January 12
th
 2011 where the price in Norway is higher than 
the price in the Netherlands the whole day. The Dutch price follows the usual pattern where 
it is low during the night and significantly higher during the day, but as the price in Norway 
is even higher it will not be profitable to import electricity to the Netherlands. In this 
situation the water value is very high due to the scarcity of the resource. This will be 
discussed further in chapter 4. 
Figure 7 Hourly price difference between the Netherlands and Norway 
(area 2) on January 12th 2011 in Euro/MWh 
 
(Statnett; EMCC, 2011) 
Increased trade between Norway and the Netherlands may actually contribute to somewhat 
even out the price differences. A simple illustration is provided in Figure 8. In autarky, the 
electricity price in the Netherlands is higher than in Norway. When we open for trade, this 
provides incentives to Norwegian producers to export electricity to the Netherlands, and 
reduce the quantity available on the domestic market from QNOR to QNOR’. The price 
increases as a result of the lower quantity available from PNOR to PNOR’. In the Dutch market, 
the available quantity of electricity is increased by the import from QNED to QNED’. As a 
result of the higher quantity, the Dutch price falls from PNED to PNED’.   
Of course, this is a static picture. To some extent there would also be a price effect on 
domestic demand. As electricity is a normal good, one would expect that a lower price of 
electricity will increase consumption, at least among power-intensive industry. This price 
effect would then increase demand, and thus increase the price of electricity. On the other 
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hand, an increase in price would give incentives to reduce consumption, which could lead to 
a slight reduction in price. For simplicity, this is not included in the illustration. Note also 
that the illustration severely over-represents the significance of a 700 MW interconnector. 
Figure 8 shows that the price difference between two countries that trade electricity is 
reduced. However, as long as the capacity of interconnectors is limited, it is very unlikely 
that the prices will fully converge. 
Figure 8 Price convergence 
 
3.3 Capacity and Ramping rules 
3.3.1 Capacity 
The technical limitations of trade are first of all related to the capacity of the interconnector. 
On NorNed this limits trade to 700 MW per hour. With the proposed construction of a 
second NorNed cable, the transfer capacity between Norway and the Netherlands will 
increase to 1400 MW. Electricity will normally be transferred from the low-price area to the 
high price area. If the transfer capacity is large enough, the two price areas will end up with 
the same price. However, how much capacity is need to achieve this will depend on the 
supply and demand in the two electricity markets.  
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3.3.2 Ramping rules  
The transfer capacity can however also be reduced due to constraints on the change in flow 
from one hour to another. This technical limitation is called ramping. The reason behind this 
restriction is to ensure system balance between aggregated supply and demand. The TSOs 
are responsible for maintaining instantaneous system balance, but tighter market integration 
and more interconnectors - first between the Nordic countries, and later also between the 
Nordic countries and the Continent - have put strain on the balancing market. Large and 
rapid changes in production as well as in flow between neighbouring countries due to price 
differences threaten the security of the system when there is imbalance.  
Imbalances in the market are dealt with in the balancing market through primary, secondary 
and tertiary reserves. Not all TSOs operate the same way, but since I choose to primarily 
focus on Norway, I will look shortly at how Statnett handle imbalances.  
Frequency is used as an indication of balance between production and consumption. In 
Europe, a system in balance has a frequency of 50.00 Hertz (Hz). If production is lower than 
consumption, the frequency falls below 50.00 Hz, or if production is higher than the 
consumption, the frequency will be higher than 50.00 Hz. 
 The primary reserves kick in automatically if the frequency falls below 49.9 Hz or 
increases above 50.1 Hz. This required that instantaneous power is available in the 
plants that supply this service. 
 The secondary reserves are spinning reserves that are manually activated. The 
spinning reserves can be activated with a response time of one minute in the quarter 
before a planned increase in production.  
 The tertiary reserves is a common market in the Nordic power market where the 
participants report the price they require to change their production or consumption. 
The TSOs can then on the basis of this information find the best method to balance 
the market.  
The ramping rules therefore limit the change in flow between two hours to provide enough 
time for the TSOs to balance the market. In the Nordic system, a maximum of 600MW 
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difference from one hour to another is applied to all HVDC
16
 interconnectors. The restriction 
was first applied to the Elspot market on Nordic interconnectors, and then from October 
2007 it was introduced on cables connecting the Nordic synchronous system and the 
Continent (Nord Pool Spot, 2007)
17
. In addition to the interconnectors Skagerrak and 
NorNed, from section 2.1.2, there are 4 more connecting the Nordic system and the 
Continental European systems where therefore ramping restrictions apply, namely Kontiskan 
(Denmark-Sweden), Kontek (Denmark-Germany), Baltic cable (Germany-Sweden) and 
SwePol (Sweden-Poland). Ramping restrictions are included in Nord Pool Spot’s calculation 
system (SESAM). In the case of Kontek and NorNed, the European Market Coupling 
Company GmbH (EMCC) has taken over the calculation after the transition from explicit to 
implicit auction on the two interconnectors. 
To illustrate the need for ramping rules, let me provide an example from the Nordic 
Operations Development Group (NOD)
18
 (2010). In order for the flow not to change too 
quickly, an additional restriction limits the flow gradient to max 30 MW per minute per 
connection. This means that for each minute, the flow can only change with 30 MW.  For 
example, if there is no flow, the first minute it can increase to 30 MW, the next minute to 60 
MW etc. With six interconnectors, this means a total flow gradient of 180 MW per minute. 
To illustrate the implication to the system, a frequency violation would occur in less than 
four minutes given a constant set-point for production, constant consumption and the current 
requirement for frequency controlled reserves. Even with the restricted flow gradient, note 
that the system operators only had four minutes to activate operational reserves and ancillary 
services before the system security was threatened.  
When ramping was introduced, the flow in the hour before and the hour after a change in the 
direction of the flow was limited to 300 MW. In practice this meant that there would be a 
gradual reduction from full export capacity. Starting 2 hours before the change in direction 
with full export of 700 MW, reduced to an export capacity of 300 MW the hour before the 
                                                 
16 HVDC stands for high voltage direct current. HVDC is used to transport electricity over longer distances as the loss in 
transmission is reduced. However, HVDC requires transformation stations at both ends to convert the electricity back to 
alternating current before it is fed into the national grid.  
17 In May 2009, ramping restrictions were also introduced in the intraday Elbas market (Nord Pool Spot, 2009). 
18 The Nordic Operations Development Group is part of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for 
Electricity (ENTSO-E) that coordinate collaboration between the European TSOs. Please see https://www.entsoe.eu/home/ 
for further details.  
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change, and from there to an import capacity of 300 MW the hour after the change of 
direction. The full import capacity of 700 MW is reached the consecutive hour. With the 
change to implicit auction on NorNed, the ramping rules were changes so that the capacity is 
no longer fixed to 300 MW, but depends on the flow the previous hour. According to 
Statnett, the change in ramping rules is a result of trying to minimise the consequences of 
ramping on the economic efficient trade solution. Examples of ramping restrictions, both 
under explicit and implicit auction, and the effects thereof, will be provided in more detail in 
chapter 7.3.  
Ramping restrictions limit flows to manageable levels. However, ramping restrictions also 
limit trade between two countries. This has consequences for trade revenues as well as the 
price convergence between the two markets. The average price effect of ramping restrictions 
is small, adding up to 1-2 Euro cents per MWh in average. However, when looking at the 
hourly price effect it can amount to as much as 1 Euro per MWh (Nordic Operations 
Development Group - ENTSO-E, 2010).  
To illustrate this consider Figure 9. There are two countries, A and B, that are at first not 
trading with each other. To simplify, the total demand is fixed by the floor in the bathtub 
(demand A + demand B). The short run marginal cost of production (SRMC) for market A 
and B are shown from left to right and right to left respectively. In autarky, supply in country 
A is equal to demand A, and the price is PA. In country B, supply is equal to demand B and 
price is PB. The price difference is quite considerable, and by allowing trade and using the 
full Available Transfer Capacity (ATC), country A can export up to ATCMAX. The price in 
country A then increases to PA MAX. In country B, due to the imported quantity of electricity, 
the price falls to PB MAX. The price difference is considerably less than in autarky, though not 
fully converged. We see that even the maximum ATC is not large enough for prices in the 
two countries to fully converge. By setting a ramping restriction on how much country A can 
export to ATCRAMP, price in country A increases to PA RAMP while it falls to PB RAMP in 
country B. Not only do the ramping restriction limits the amount of trade, but it also reduces 
the price convergence so that the prices are further apart than in the maximum export case. 
However, even with the ramping restriction the prices are closer together than under autarky. 
The light blue trapezium therefore represents net loss due to ramping. The ramping 
restriction causes market B to produce electricity at a high price, and market A to reduce 
production at low price compared to the situation with no ramping. The light blue trapezium 
therefore represents the increased production costs (Nordic Operations Development Group - 
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ENTSO-E, 2010).  Note also another simplification in the illustration; there is no price effect 
on demand.  
Figure 9 Illustration of ramping restriction 
 
    (Nordic Operations Development Group - ENTSO-E, 2010) 
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4. Electricity trade on NorNed 
After years on the planning board, and three years of construction, NorNed opened for trade 
on May 6
th
 2008. Since then, as Table 1 shows, 5248 GWh of electricity have been imported 
to Norway, while 7549 GWh have been exported. Throughout the chapter import refers to 
import to Norway, and export refers to export from Norway unless otherwise stated.  
Table 1 Import and export of electricity between Norway and the 
Netherlands 2008-2011 in GWh 
GWh 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Import 332 1250 2280 1456 5319 
Export 3013 2878 1349 160 7400 
Net import -2681 -1628 931 1296 -2082 
         (Statnett; EMCC, 2011) 
4.1 Daily variations 
In chapter 3, I discussed that Norway should import electricity during the night, and export 
during the peak hours in the Netherlands. Figure 10 shows the average prices for the 
Netherlands and Norway in Euro/MWh for the whole period with trade on NorNed that I am 
researching, i.e. May 12
th
 2008 to April 19
th
 2011. The average Dutch price peaks at around 
noon at €65.55/MWh, but there is also a smaller peak at around 7 pm at €61.06/MWh. The 
minimum price is at around 5 am at €28.22/MWh. The Norwegian price is quite even, with a 
minimum of €40.91/MWh at 4 am, and a maximum of €46.69/MWh at noon. The average 
prices indicate that the trade pattern should follow the pattern of export during from 8 am 
until midnight, and import from midnight until 8. 
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Figure 10 Average prices for the Netherlands (APX) and Norway (NO2 - 
Nord Pool Spot) in Euro/MWh from 12.05.2008 to 19.04.2011 
 
(Statnett; EMCC, 2011) 
Figure 11 shows the import and export of electricity per hour on NorNed from 2008 to 2011, 
broken down into a yearly average. Imports are positive, while exports are shown as negative 
numbers. This figure shows that in 2008, Norway on average exported electricity apart from 
a period from 3 to 5 am when there was import in a small scale. There is a slight decrease in 
average exports around 4 pm. In 2009 the same pattern as in 2008 occurs, but with higher 
average import and lower average export volumes. The import period at night is also longer 
from about midnight until 7 am. The average numbers for 2010 somewhat replicate the same 
flow pattern as in 2009, but with more import at night. The import period also lasts from 
about 9 pm until 8 am, thereby both starting earlier and ending later than in 2009. The 
average exports levels are significantly lower than in 2009. So far in 2011, Norway has on 
average imported electricity both night and day, but with smaller average import volume 
around noon and around 20 pm. The 2011 numbers only include up to April 19
th
 2011 and 
are therefore not directly comparable with the other yearly averages. 
All in all, the import and export patterns correspond quite well to what is expected from the 
average prices in Figure 10, though there are significant variations from year to year.  
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Figure 11 Imports and exports of electricity on NorNed 2008-2011 (MW). 
Imports to Norway are positive, exports negative. 
 
                 (Statnett; EMCC, 2011) 
4.2 Monthly and annual variations 
To look closer at the variations I divided the import and export volumes into monthly 
averages. In a longer time scale, the possibility to store water becomes more important and 
the dynamic aspect of Førsund’s model becomes even more relevant. This period’s 
production is therefore not only based on current period’s precipitation, but also on what is 
left in the reservoirs from last period. This gives a more realistic picture of the Norwegian 
hydroelectric production and provides a further explanation to the annual variations.  
From Figure 12 we see that Norway has on average exported electricity to the Netherlands 
from May to December, while imports are larger than exports from January until April. The 
figure illustrates the dynamic nature of electricity trade where the changes in imports not 
only are related to the time of day, but also the time of the year. When dividing the year into 
a summer and a winter season, Førsund’s two period model can serve to illustrate average 
flow of electricity trade.  
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Figure 12 Average Norwegian import and export of electricity on NorNed 
per month 2008-2011 
 
(Statnett; EMCC, 2011) 
By looking at monthly import and export numbers for each year, rather than the average 
monthly figure for the whole period, we can see significant differences from the average 
trend line from Figure 12.  
Figure 13 shows the net Norwegian electricity import on NorNed from 2008 to 2011 per 
month. In 2008 there was a large net export for all the months that NorNed was operative. 
The 2009 numbers shows net export for all months, apart for a small net import in May. The 
2010 numbers show net import for all months apart from July and October
19
. In 2011, there 
is significant net import for all the months in my dataset.  
                                                 
19 NorNed was out of service from 27.01.10 – 27.04.10 which is why there are no numbers for this period.  
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Figure 13 Net Norwegian electricity trade on NorNed per month 2008-2011. 
Imports are positive, exports negative.  
 
(Statnett; EMCC, 2011) 
Seen together with the water level in the reservoirs and the yearly temperature variations, the 
variations in imports and exports are easier to understand. Figure 14 shows the volume of 
water in the reservoirs in percent for the years 2008 to 2011. As can be seen in the diagram, 
2008 had an above average water level, also reflected in the high net export of 2681 GWh 
from Table 1. 2009, with a close to average water level, had a moderate net export of 1629 
GWh. 2010 and 2011 had significantly lower water levels in the reservoirs, which is also 
reflected in the net import of respectively 931 GWh and 1296 GWh.  
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Figure 14 Water level in reservoirs per week 2008-2011 in percent 
 
(NVE, 2011) 
The resulting net imports and exports for each year can also be highlighted by looking at 
temperature as this is a key element of the demand function for electricity in Norway. In the 
domestic sector 47.7 percent has electric ovens as the main source of heating (SSB, 2011), 
which means that a below average temperature will significantly increase electricity 
consumption.  
Figure 15 shows the average temperature difference between the actual temperature in Oslo 
for each year and the average temperature from 1998-2011. It shows that late winter 07-08 
was warmer than the average, which would leave more water in the reservoirs as less 
electricity was used for heating. This also explains the high net exports in 2008. The winters 
in 09-10 and 10-11 were colder than average. This means that more water was used to 
produce electricity to heat buildings, and less was available to produce for export. Even from 
this very limited dataset, the link between temperature and reservoir level is evident.  
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Figure 15 Average temperature difference between actual temperature in 
Oslo and monthly average 1998-2011 
  
         (Norwegian Meteorological Institute, 2011) 
 
The combination of reduced production due to less water inflow, and higher domestic 
electricity consumption would increase prices considerably. The extremely low water levels 
in the reservoirs combined with below average temperatures in the winter 2010-2011 can 
therefore explain the large import values so far in 2011, as the low reservoir values push 
prices up beyond the “normal” winter price, and above the Dutch electricity price.  
Førsund’s model therefore explains much of the variations in import and export on NorNed 
from 2008 to 2011. The reservoir restriction takes into account the significance of water 
level in the reservoirs. The consumption factor implicitly includes the effect of temperature 
on consumption patterns and electricity price, and therefore also the amount available for 
export.   
The dataset shows that Norwegian electricity producers profit by exporting during the 
summer and fall, before knowing how much precipitation will come in the fall. For example, 
in the beginning of the summer 2010, the exports of electricity were about the same as the 
previous years, and the reservoirs were assumed to replenish during the fall. As the fall 
progressed with little precipitation, water became scarcer in the reservoirs, the water value 
increased. Exports fell as prices increased and it became profitable to sell in the domestic 
market rather than export. This situation illustrates the challenge of predicting precipitation 
and winter temperature beforehand, and the need for accurate metrological models.  
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5. An introduction to market mechanisms 
The European regulation on cross-border electricity trade, Regulation no 1228/2003, has the 
intention to facilitate electricity trade by integrating European electricity markets. A variety 
of different methods have previously been applied to the allocation of cross-border trade. 
This regulation now states that only explicit or implicit auctions may be used to allocate 
cross-border capacity (European Commission, 2003). 
In order to build NorNed, licences had to be obtained from the regulatory authorities in 
Norway (NVE) and the Netherlands (DTe). A prerequisite from NVE for the licence was 
that implicit auction was to be used. However, due to challenges related to market 
harmonisation – for example differences in closing time – a temporary market solution of 
explicit auction was allowed. The exemption lasted only until the end of 2008, but has since 
then been renewed on a yearly basis until the 13
th
 of January 2011 when implicit auction was 
introduced. The general differences between explicit and implicit auctions will be elaborated 
below.  
5.1 Explicit auction 
In general, the explicit auction separates the auctioning of transmission capacity and 
electricity on an interconnector into two different steps.  
1. Transmission capacity auction: First, the transmission capacity on an interconnector 
between two markets (or market areas) is auctioned. Transmission capacity is 
normally auctioned in portions in annual, monthly and daily auctions in Physical 
Transmission Rights (PTR). Depending on the system, these PTR can either be an 
obligation or an option to transfer electricity. In an optional system, the PTRs can 
either be lost without compensation if not used (use-it-or-lose-it principle), or they 
can be resold (use-it-or-sell-it principle). Note that the value of transmission capacity 
in this system is not necessarily dependent on the price of electricity, but rather an 
indication of congestion due to limited capacity (Leuthold, 2006). These auctions can 
be provided either by the TSOs themselves, or by an auction office acting on their 
behalf.  
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2. Setting the price of electricity: The second step involves obtaining and selling the 
electricity needed to make the deliveries agreed to in the first step by matching 
supply and demand, and consequently setting the price of electricity. This may take 
place at power exchanges or in OTC-markets
20
. Since the wave of deregulation of 
electricity markets, it is normally done at the power exchange through the day-ahead 
market.  
The main advantage of the explicit auction is that it is a simple market mechanism that 
requires little harmonisation between the involved systems. This makes implementation 
easy, and is a major reason for why it has been commonly used on interconnectors in Europe 
(EuroPEX and ETSO, 2009).  
However, in terms of efficiency the explicit market mechanism has several flaws. This 
relates to the non-efficient allocation of power. As the two markets are separate, this can lead 
to an inefficient utilisation of interconnectors. The lack of price information when deciding 
how much transfer capacity to buy, leads to situations where the direction of the capacity, 
and thus also trade, runs in the opposite direction of what is economically rational, i.e. from 
an area with high price to an area with lower price. This is not an efficient utilisation of the 
interconnector, which could have been used to transfer electricity in the other direction, thus 
generating increased social welfare. Trades in the adverse direction may thus also enhance 
the price difference between two areas.   
Some market participants will therefore bid on transmission rights in both directions as they 
do not know the direction of the flow the next day. Thus, the explicit auction is not only 
inefficient from a social point of view as it may lead to situations of adverse flow, but can 
also lead to superfluous for expenses for market participants. 
The explicit auction requires good transparency and liquid intraday adjustment markets to 
overcome these inefficiencies (EuroPEX and ETSO, 2009). In immature electricity markets 
these factors - transparency and liquidity - are normally not well developed which can 
augment the loss of explicit auctions compared with implicit auctions. 
 
                                                 
20 OTC-markets: electricity is traded Over-The-Counter (OTC) directly between sellers and buyers outside the electricity 
markets. 
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5.2 Implicit auction 
In the implicit auction the flow is implicitly determined from market information provided 
by the power exchanges, so that the day-ahead transmission capacity is used to integrate spot 
markets in different bidding areas. Both the cost of electricity and the cost of congestion are 
included in the resulting area prices. Implicit auctions therefore ensure that the electricity on 
the interconnectors flows from the low price area to the high price area, even in periods 
where there is uncertainty about the price difference at the time of capacity nomination.  
The market value of the transmission capacity will then be exactly equal to the price 
difference between the markets. When there is no congestion, the area prices will converge 
as long as the transmission capacity is sufficiently large. Only when there is real congestion, 
will there be congestion costs and the interconnector will automatically be utilised to the 
maximum degree possible. Thus, market integration through the implicit auction maximises 
overall social welfare in both (or more) markets (Nord Pool Spot).  
The implicit auction also necessitates liquid electricity markets in the connecting areas (or at 
least one of them). Without a liquid market, it can be difficult get the necessary information 
to set the correct market value the transmission capacity. Even if only one of the two markets 
involved in the implicit auction has a reasonable level of liquidity, the implicit auction can 
be at least as effective as explicit auction. Also implicit auction can improve market 
efficiency in the least developed market by increasing competition, improving efficiency in 
capacity allocation and reducing transaction costs. Over time this will provide outcomes that 
are superior to explicit auctions. The integration of Finland into Nord Pool in 1998 can be 
seen as an example of an immature market being connected by implicit auction to an already 
liquid energy market to produce a more efficient energy market in Finland. Another example 
is the benefits reaped by the Belgian energy market by participating in the Trilateral Market 
Coupling (TLC)
21
 with the Netherlands and France (EuroPEX and ETSO, 2009).  
However, in order to achieve this optimal welfare allocation, the degree of harmonisation 
needed between the markets needed is significantly higher than with explicit auction. What 
is actually an economic problem is therefore transformed into a political question. As 
                                                 
21 The predecessor of the current pentalateral market discussed in chapter 2. 
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electricity is such an important part of our daily lives, politicians can be reluctant to hand 
over control. By participating in an implicit auction system, national politicians have little 
influence on the market allocation. From an economic efficiency point of view, this is 
positive, but politicians might choose to see it differently when voters complain.  
Implicit auctions can be divided further into market coupling and market splitting depending 
on the organisation of the power exchanges involved.    
5.2.1 Market splitting  
In market splitting, the implicit auction is managed by a single power exchange that operates 
across the connected areas. The best known example of market splitting is Nord Pool Spot 
which functions as the power exchange for the whole Nordic region. From section 2.1.2, we 
remember that the transmission capacity is implicitly handled by Nord Pool Spot through the 
bid matching process that first determines the system price. If the transmission capacity 
between the bidding areas within the Nordic market area is not large enough to get 
convergence to a single price, the market is split and the result is different area prices 
(Andersen et al., 2008).  
After all bids have been received, Nord Pool Spot calculate the system price by matching the 
aggregate demand with the aggregate supply curve. The system price for each hour is 
determined by the intersection of the two curves. If there are no constraints between bidding 
areas, the area price will equal the system price. This is however not always the case.  
Supply and demand from the bidding contracts has to be put in relation to the grid capacity. 
This is done by introducing different Elspot bidding areas, and thereby using price 
mechanisms to relieve congestion. The Elspot bidding areas are geographic bidding markets 
at the interconnections between the Nordic countries. The bidding areas are determined by 
the TSOs based on physical conditions. Finland, Sweden
22
 and Estonia all have one bidding 
area geographically delimited by the national borders. Norway and Denmark have 
respectively five and two bidding areas.  
                                                 
22 On November 1st 2011, Sweden will be divided into four bidding areas to comply with European Commission ruling. 
The EC decided that Svenska Kraftnät’s (SvK - the Swedish TSO) handling of internal congestion could be against the rules 
governing free trade of goods and services by moving internal limitations to the border and thereby discriminating foreign 
customers. For more information, please see www.svk.se 
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To illustrate, Figure 16 shows how market splitting works in practice at Nord Pool Spot on 
June 20
th
 2011. The system price is €42.87, whereas none of the area prices are equal to this, 
indicating congestion and/or maintenance work on the cables between the price areas.  
Figure 16 Illustration of market splitting in Nord Pool Spot June 20th 2011 
 
   (Nord Pool Spot, 2009) 
The idea behind market splitting is that on the surplus side of the congestion point the price 
falls while it rises in the deficit area giving a price signal that there is electricity shortage 
thereby lowering transmission. The different price areas can thus signal a need for 
investment in transmission grid as lack of transmission capacity splits a single market into 
two or more parts.  
5.2.2 Market coupling 
In market coupling the implicit auction is organised between two (or more) power 
exchanges. Each power exchange operates in their own market area, and submits the 
necessary market information to a central coupling system that runs an algorithm that 
provides prices in all markets, as well as the flows between them. The flows between the 
markets are then used to match the local bids, but the local market can also adapt the prices 
and bid results from the central coupling algorithm, depending on the type of market 
coupling: price coupling or (tight or loose) volume market coupling (Nord Pool Spot). 
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 Price coupling 
In price coupling, a single centralised system calculates market prices, makes a list of 
selected block orders for each bidding area, as well as determines the flows between 
the bidding areas. This calculation algorithm is based on the amount of cross-border 
capacity available from the TSOs and the order books of all the power exchanges in 
the coupled region. The results are then used by the local market exchanges to 
calculate each participant’s contribution into the local exchange.  An example of 
price coupling is the Trilateral Market Coupling (TLC) linking the Dutch, the Belgian 
and the French electricity markets since 2006.  
 Volume coupling 
There are two versions of volume coupling, depending on how closely the central 
market coupling system follows the rules of the local markets.  
- Tight volume coupling: The central algorithm uses the full information on 
bids and offers from the local exchanges and fully replicates the matching 
rules from the different power exchanges. Therefore, the centrally calculated 
flows in tight volume coupling will be the same as under price coupling. The 
difference is that while under price coupling, the central algorithm calculates 
both the price and the flows. In volume coupling, only the flows are 
calculated centrally, while the local exchanges calculate the prices.  
- Loose volume coupling: The difference between tight and loose volume 
coupling comes from the amount of relevant information included in the 
central algorithm. Under loose volume coupling, the central algorithm does 
not include all factors relevant for price determination and the matching rules 
of the local exchanges are not necessarily fully replicated in the central 
algorithm. This can lead to imprecise flow determinations between the 
markets, both in terms of the magnitude of the flow as well as the direction of 
flow. When this information is put into the local market algorithm to 
determine price, the results might deliver adverse flows and less price 
convergence between the market areas, thus reducing social welfare from a 
tight volume coupling or a price coupling solution.  
Since the price and flow are set in two different operations, volume coupling might 
lead to adverse flows or price discrepancies due to differences in the matching 
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algorithms, in the implementation of market rules, or in the completeness of the 
market data delivered to the central algorithm (Nord Pool Spot). Volume coupling is 
therefore often seen as a step towards price coupling. On the other hand, due to the 
same reasons that may lead to inefficiencies, volume coupling offers a degree of 
flexibility. Moving towards tighter market coupling imposes more control and 
coordination requirements. For price coupling, a complete harmonisation of matching 
and price rules between power exchanges is required (EuroPEX and ETSO, 2009).  
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6. NorNed  
NorNed received an exemption from the licence terms of market coupling from the 
Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (OED) and explicit auctions were allowed as a 
temporary solution. As the preconditions for efficient organisation of implicit auctioning 
were not satisfied on the Dutch side (Pettersen & Korvald, 2008), implicit auction was not 
introduced on NorNed until January 13
th
 2011.  
6.1 Explicit auction on NorNed 
Initially, the explicit auctions were administered by Statnett and TenneT who organised day-
ahead auctions for Physical Transfer Rights (PTRs – the right to transfer one MW of 
electricity during one hour). The Available Transmission Capacity (ATC) was set by the two 
TSOs, Statnett and TenneT, and was published 30 minutes before the participants had to 
deliver their bids on the auction webpage http://www.norned-auction.org/. This was 
normally set to full capacity of 700 MW, unless maintenance or errors limited capacity.  
In order to trade electricity on NorNed, the participants must have an agreement with either 
TenneT or Statnett (or both) for access to the wholesale electrical power market either in the 
Netherlands or in Norway (i.e. either as a Program Responsible party or a Balance 
Responsible Party, or both). In addition, the participants need to register with the NorNed 
auction, as well as with Nord Pool Spot and APX, as all import or export of electricity must 
be carried out through the local power exchange according to Norwegian and Dutch law.  
Bids were submitted separately for each hour for the next day, containing direction, volume, 
and price. First of all, the direction of the flow of electricity was determined by setting a 
theoretical limit of 300 MW in both directions. The bids were then sorted from highest price 
to lowest, and the first bid that was not accepted became the direction fixing bid. This was 
done for both directions. The higher of these two bids then determined the direction of the 
flow of electricity. Once the direction of flow was found, the available transfer capacity was 
filled to 700 MW using the highest bids first so that the price of the last accepted bid in an 
hour determined the auction price for that hour (Statnett; TenneT, 2008). 
The transfer capacity available was published at 09:15 hrs of the preceding day, and 
participants could bid on transmission rights for the next day up to 09:45 hrs. The auction 
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price and the available capacity that has been auctioned out, were published on the NorNed 
auction webpage by 10:15 hrs. The trade on the day-ahead markets (Nord Pool Spot and 
APX) determines the price in Norway and the Netherlands. Based on that, the participants in 
possession of PTRs could decide how much of electricity they wanted to transfer and 
reported this to the TSOs by 14:00 the day of the auction (Pettersen & Korvald, 2008). 
Purchased PTRs that were chosen not to be nominated for use, were neither reimbursed, nor 
compensated in accordance with the use-it-or-lose-it principle (Statnett; TenneT, 2008).  
6.2 Implicit auction on NorNed 
The implicit auction, or more specifically, tight volume coupling, was introduced on NorNed 
from the 13
th
 of January 2011, eliminating the need for PTR auctions. The optimal flow 
between the Norwegian and Dutch market areas is calculated by European Market Coupling 
Company GmbH (EMCC). Founded in 2008, EMCC is a joint venture between Nord Pool 
Spot, the European Energy Exchange (EEX), 50Hertz Transmission, TenneT TSO and 
Energinet.dk. EMCC provides congestion management by allocating available cross-border 
capacities in implicit auctions for interconnectors between CWE and the Nordic countries, 
more explicitly, on the interconnectors between Germany and Denmark, the Baltic Cable, 
and now also NorNed.  
The morning of the day-ahead auction the TSOs determine the capacity of the 
interconnector. The two exchanges, Nord Pool Spot and APX, receive bids in their market 
area by noon and transfer the order books to EMCC. Based on market coupling capacities 
and prices, EMCC calculates optimal electricity flow called the market coupling flow – 
MCF, using an algorithm to maximise economic welfare. After calculating the MCF, these 
are transmitted as price-independent bids back to the power exchanges, who then calculate 
their own prices taking the bids from EMCC into account (EMCC, 2011). The MCFs are 
also sent to the TSOs, thereby fixing the flow on the interconnector.  
Whenever there is a price difference between the two market areas, the EMCC receives a 
congestion rent equal to the MCF multiplied with the price difference. This congestion rent 
is consequently then to the owners of the interconnector, Statnett and TenneT.  
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7. From explicit to implicit auction 
The implicit auction was introduced on NorNed from the 13
th
 of January 2011. As discussed 
in chapter 4, the unusually cold temperatures in 2011 led to high consumption which in 
combination with low water reserves in this period led to high electricity prices. 
Furthermore, since prices in Norway have been significantly higher than the Dutch prices, 
electricity has almost exclusively been imported since the transition. This means that the data 
available after the introduction of the implicit auction not only is limited in terms of time 
frame, but also limited in terms of the number of changes in the flow direction. Changes in 
the direction of trade caused problems under explicit auction. We have therefore mainly used 
from the explicit auction to illustrate the differences in outcome between the two auction 
forms.  
7.1 Adverse flows 
As discussed in 5.1 the most significant shortcoming of explicit auction is that the flow and 
the trade of electricity actually can flow from the high-price area to the low-price area. This 
is mainly due to the separate determination of transfer volume and price.  
Under the explicit auction, the available transfer capacity is auctioned before the price of 
electricity is known. This can lead to situations where the predetermined flow direction of 
electricity on an interconnector like NorNed, can be the in the other direction of what the 
price difference indicates. This is called adverse flow. For the participants it would therefore 
be unprofitable to trade electricity in the set direction, as they would lose money.  
The explicit auction rules on NorNed allowed participants to choose not to use the capacity 
they had bought. The participants had to let the TSO know how much of the bought capacity 
they wished to use by 2 pm the preceding day. This was called to nominate capacity. This 
follows from the use-it-or-lose-it principle discussed in section 6.1. This means that not all 
capacity that was bought, was actually used to trade electricity. Adverse flow was the most 
common reason for not nominating some or all of the bought capacity.  
Sometimes capacity is nominated even though the flow is adverse to the price. The decision 
to nominate transfer capacity under adverse flow may be due to costs related to starting and 
stopping thermal plants. Block bidding can also make it more profitable to utilise the bought 
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transfer capacity over all the hours included in the block bid, rather than not transfer at all. 
Likewise, there are examples where there is no price difference between the two areas, but 
where some exchange still takes place
23
.  
Table 2 illustrates the adverse flow problem under explicit auction by looking at data from 
September 1
st
 2009. A negative price difference between Norway and the Netherlands 
indicates a higher price in the Netherlands than in Norway (column 8). This should thus be 
combined with export of electricity from Norway to the Netherlands. However, as 
transmission capacity is set before the price in explicit auction, there are many examples of 
adverse flows. That is, electricity is imported to Norway, when it should have been exported. 
These incidents are market in red. Here, hour 3 is used as an example of adverse flow: 
although the prices are higher in the Netherlands (see column 8), Norway is importing 
electricity (column 3).  
Table 2 also shows that though 300 MW of transmission capacity was bought in the auction 
for hour 3 (column 2), only 175 MW were nominated (column 3). In practice this means that 
125 MW of transfer capacity was paid for, but never utilised. From hour 15 to 17, the 
opposite situation occurs with prices being higher in Norway than in the Netherlands, yet 
Norway is still exporting electricity. Just as during the night, some of the transfer capacity 
bought was never used.  
 
  
                                                 
23 An example could be hour 16 on July 12 2009, where 250 MWh where transmitted while there was no price difference 
between NO2-APX. 
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Table 2 Example of adverse flows under explicit auction: 01.09.2009 
Hour 
Bought 
capacity 
import 
Nominated 
capacity 
import 
Bought 
capacity 
export 
Nominated 
capacity 
export 
Auction 
price 
import 
Auction 
price 
export 
ΔPrice 
NO2-
APX 
1 0 0 700 700 0 1,34 -2,82 
2 0 0 300 300 0 0,56 -2,58 
3 300 175 0 0 0,51 0 -2,71 
4 699 499 0 0 0,51 0 0,48 
5 698 498 0 0 0,51 0 1,92 
6 695 495 0 0 0,51 0 3,6 
7 300 300 0 0 0,51 0 2,66 
8 0 0 300 100 0 0,03 7,09 
9 0 0 700 200 0 0,62 -1,14 
10 0 0 700 400 0 2,9 0,44 
11 0 0 700 659 0 4,52 -1,75 
12 0 0 700 700 0 6,43 -2,11 
13 0 0 700 700 0 7,12 -4,5 
14 0 0 700 700 0 5,3 -2,2 
15 0 0 700 574 0 3,34 0,05 
16 0 0 700 268 0 1,51 0,55 
17 0 0 700 313 0 1,36 0,78 
18 0 0 700 655 0 2,93 -0,58 
19 0 0 700 700 0 6,51 -2,95 
20 0 0 700 700 0 7,67 -7,48 
21 0 0 700 700 0 9,11 -10,87 
22 0 0 700 700 0 11,44 -13,8 
23 0 0 700 700 0 11,04 -12,7 
24 0 0 700 700 0 5,89 -5,33 
 
Let us return for a moment to the adverse flows on NorNed under the explicit auction. By 
summing the cases where the flow direction is adverse to what would be expected from the 
price and dividing by the 23,424 observations in the dataset, I find that the flow has been 
adverse 12.5% of the hours. This result is quite similar to the results Kristiansen (2007) got 
in his study of the explicit auction on the interconnector between Denmark and Germany 
(KONTEK) from 2003 to 2005. He found that in cases where the West-Danish (DK2) area 
price was higher than the German Energy Exchange (EEX) price, power still flowed towards 
the low price area (EEX) in 8 percent of the time. When the price was lower in DK2, power 
nevertheless flowed in direction of Denmark in 6 percent of the time. 
Kristiansen found that one of the reasons for adverse flows was local congestion. The day-
ahead price for a larger area may not reflect local conditions of for example congestion close 
to the borders, although this may be a factor that leads the TSO to restrict flow on an 
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interconnector. Therefore this might be a significant factor influencing transmission capacity 
that is not included in the auction price mechanism. I would assume the same also might 
hold for NorNed, though I have no knowledge of local congestion conditions around Feda 
and Eemshaven. 
Another factor Kristiansen found to be a reason for adverse flow was related to the timing of 
the commitments. In a daily auction of transfer capacity, a market player can purchase 
capacity, and later refrain from using it if the calculated spot price makes trade unprofitable 
following the use-it-or-lose-it principle. This also means that an option valuation framework 
in this setting is the appropriate method for valuing transfer capacity and stating bids. 
Specifically he found that even though, on average, prices were higher in Germany than in 
West Denmark, an option to transfer power the other way would still have value if there are 
hours in which the prices are higher in West Denmark. Insecurity and predictions therefore 
also played an important role in capacity bidding under explicit auction. This clearly also 
applies to the trade of electricity on NorNed. We saw that on average in a dry year, the price 
of electricity is higher in Norway than in the Netherlands. Yet the hourly difference between 
the two prices make an option to flow power the opposite direction have value.   
7.2 Uncertainty and revenue 
It is important to remember that in the vast majority of cases the two auction forms produce 
analogous outcomes in terms of direction of flow. The explicit auction resulted in the correct 
direction of trade in 87.5 percent of the time on NorNed.  
However, the same direction of trade does not necessarily mean that the two auction 
mechanisms generate the same revenue. There may be several reasons for this: 
 For the explicit auction the auction price is set by the last bid accepted when the bids 
were ranged from highest to lowest. This may in principle differ from the market 
clearing bid in the implicit auction.  
 The revenue from the explicit auction is the outcome of an auction for capacity, 
which is carried out prior to actual hourly price difference are revealed. The revenue 
of the implicit auction is the flow multiplied by the actual price differences. In the 
dataset, this is estimated to be the price difference multiplied by the available 
capacity.  
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The risk involved in explicit auction is therefore higher than in the implicit auction as 
capacity and price is not set at the same time. The risk is somewhat reduced by the use-it-or-
lose-it principle, but the participant has still has to pay the auction price, even if the price 
differences imply unprofitable trade. This risk will in principle be reflected in how much the 
participants are willing to bid for transfer capacity in an explicit auction. Therefore, even if 
the direction of the flow is the same, and the volume transmitted is the same, the revenues 
from the two auction forms are not directly comparable on a short time scale. 
To illustrate, Table 3 shows the hourly auction results for January 12
th
 2011. There is no 
change in direction or change in the volume transferred. However, the explicit auction price 
for capacity and the price difference for each hour is not the same, which when multiplied by 
the 700 MWh transferred each hour, generates the differences between the total hourly 
explicit auction income and the total hourly implicit trade revenues. In total the difference 
between the implicit and explicit auction aggregates to more than 10,000 Euros for these 24 
hours. This difference could partly be caused by the difference in risk as well as prediction 
errors by the participants.  
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Table 3 Example of same flow direction, different revenues under explicit 
and implicit auction: January 12th 2011  
Time 
Available 
capacity 
import 
Auction 
price 
import 
Price 
difference 
NO2-APX 
 Auction 
income 
(explicit) 
Trade 
revenues 
(implicit) 
1 700 25.25 33.68 17675 23576 
2 700 28.19 37.32 19733 26124 
3 700 31.,25 47.02 21875 32914 
4 700 37.18 54.8 26026 38360 
5 700 35.75 57.31 25025 40117 
6 700 28.37 39.06 19859 27342 
7 700 20.11 28.16 14077 19712 
8 700 12.24 14.22 8568 9954 
9 700 10.11 12.01 7077 8407 
10 700 10.48 11.58 7336 8106 
11 700 9.56 10.43 6692 7301 
12 700 8.08 8.82 5656 6174 
13 700 7.19 11.29 5033 7903 
14 700 8.11 11.88 5677 8316 
15 700 10.11 11.86 7077 8302 
16 700 13.85 14.06 9695 9842 
17 700 11.56 12.76 8092 8932 
18 700 4.51 6.48 3157 4536 
19 700 2.74 5.72 1918 4004 
20 700 6.11 12.06 4277 8442 
21 700 11.21 19.72 7847 13804 
22 700 19.11 24.73 13377 17311 
23 700 17.56 23 12292 16100 
24 700 22.11 27.56 15477 19292 
    Total Total 273518 374871 
 
7.3 The effect of ramping on revenue 
The transition from explicit to implicit auction raised many questions regarding the 
quantification of the benefit of increased efficiency. An estimate of the value of the 
transition is to look at the revenue streams under the two different auction forms. Statnett 
compares the actual explicit auction income to what the income could have been using the 
implicit auction instead. The revenues streams are generated thus: 
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 In the explicit auction the revenue is the auction income from the transmission 
capacity actually bought.  
 For the implicit auction, the gain per MWh is the price difference between Norway 
(NO2) and the Netherlands.   
To illustrate Table 4 shows the estimated income in hours 1 through 12 on the 18
th
 of July 
2009. Following from Statnett’s data, the difference in revenue from the two auction forms is 
almost 28,000 Euros - a large sum considering the short time span we are looking at. This 
indicates a huge advantage of the implicit auction form over the explicit.  
Table 4 Difference in revenue due to ramping 18.06.2009 
Hour 
 Auction 
income 
(explicit) 
Trade 
revenues 
(implicit) 
1 3 3143 
2 279 2086 
3 896 2730 
4 570 1547 
5 153 9639 
6 876 5285 
7 606 3745 
8 153 917 
9 1743 1449 
10 3255 3549 
11 5600 6076 
12 8036 9933 
 
22170 50099 
 
For one thing, part of the difference in revenue may be attributed to the timing aspect as 
commented upon in the section above. However, there is another reason for this difference, a 
difference that makes these numbers clearly misleading. A more detailed review and analysis 
of the underlying numbers, shows that the ramping restrictions are not included in the 
calculations of the implicit trade revenues. We remember from section 3.3 that ramping rules 
have been introduced on all HVDC interconnectors including NorNed.  
For NorNed, the ramping restrictions under the explicit auction limited the load to 300 MW 
one hour before and one hour after a shift in the direction of the flow. This number was fixed 
by Nordel, now NOD, thus dividing the change equally between the two hours related to 
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change. In practice, to turn the flow from full import to full export on NorNed, this will take 
4 hours before the full effect is reflected in the revenue stream. The first hour will have full 
import, the following importing 300 MW, the next export 300 MW and then finally export 
700 MW. In addition, the ramping restriction comes into play when starting transmission 
after for example a breakdown. If there was no transmission an hour, ramping rules limit the 
flow to 600 MW the following hour.  
Table 5 illustrates the effect of ramping rules, both in terms of transfer capacity and in term 
of revenue. Columns 2 and 3 show the bought capacity of the line. The full capacity is 700 
MW. However, we see that the capacity is limited to 300 MW in hours 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. 
Columns 5, 6 and 7 show the calculation of the hourly revenue on the interconnector. The 
explicit auction income using the real income from bought capacity, is shown in column 2 
and 3. The trade revenues of the implicit auction are the estimated revenue, as shown in the 
dataset provided by Statnett. Here, this is the price difference multiplied by the energy that 
would have been traded at maximum available capacity
24
, which is 700 MW in this case or 
the equivalent of a flow of 700 MWh for one hour. In the corrected trade revenues from 
implicit auction, I have corrected the flow to what actually is maximum permissible trade 
flow due to the ramping restrictions in the hours where this is applicable, i.e. hours 1, 2, 4, 5, 
6, 7 and 8. The actual available transmission capacity is then multiplied by the price 
difference to get the corrected trade revenue from implicit auction. The difference in revenue 
from explicit to implicit auction is now 13,000 Euros, a reduction by more than half simply 
by including the ramping restrictions. This point will be further developed in chapter 8 when 
the differences are aggregated for the whole dataset.  
Note that the revenues from the implicit auction are only an estimate of what the real implicit 
could achieve, as an implicit auction was not run at the same time. This means that the flaws 
in direction of trade which are set by the actual explicit auction also are reproduced in the 
fictional implicit revenues. 
 
                                                 
24 Statnett sets the Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) to 700 MW unless there is maintenance or other reasons that indicate 
a need to reduce transfer capacity.  
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Table 5 Example of ramping restriction in practice 18.06.2009 
Hour 
Bought 
capacity 
import 
Bought 
capacity 
export 
Price 
difference 
NO2-APX 
 Auction 
income 
(explicit) 
Trade 
revenues 
(implicit) 
Corrected 
trade revenue 
(implicit) 
1 0 300 4.49 3 3143 1347 
2 300 0 2.98 279 2086 894 
3 700 0 -3.9 896 2730 2730 
4 300 0 -2.21 570 1547 663 
5 0 300 13.77 153 9639 4131 
6 300 0 7.55 876 5285 2265 
7 300 0 5.35 606 3745 1605 
8 0 300 1.31 153 917 393 
9 0 700 -2.07 1743 1449 1449 
10 0 700 -5.07 3255 3549 3549 
11 0 700 -8.68 5600 6076 6076 
12 0 700 -14.19 8036 9933 9933 
   
Total 22170 50099 35035 
 
The implicit auction was introduced on NorNed in January 2011. With the introduction of 
the new market mechanism, the ramping rules were also changed. Under the real implicit 
auction that is used on NorNed today, the load restrictions are not fixed to 300 MW before a 
change in flow direction as under the explicit auction. Since the implicit auction price and 
transfer capacity is set at the same time, the direction changes when the price changes. The 
maximum change from one hour to another is still 600 MW. Note however, that the effect of 
the ramping restriction on the final capacity is not a fixed number, but depends on the 
volume determined by bids the previous hours. This complicates the determination of the 
correct capacity limit when including ramping, but increases efficiency.   
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Table 6 can illustrate: The first shift in between hour 8 and 9 has the usual ramping 
restriction of a maximum 600 MW change per hour. So the flow is decreased from full 
import in hour 7 to importing 100 MW in hour 8, i.e. the maximum allowed change. 
Changing another 600 MW from 100 MW import gives 500 MW export in hour 9, and 
finally 700 MW are being exported in hour 10. The difficulty comes when the flow is 
changed back from full export to full import in hours 13 to 16. Market demand is limited to 
209 MW in hour 14, thus a change of 491 MW below the maximum change allowed. In hour 
15 all the permissible change per hour is used, turning the flow from exporting 209 MW to 
importing 390 MW. Finally, in hour 16, a full 700 MW is imported.  
Today the trade income is based on the coupled capacities multiplied by the price difference 
between the two markets. As the coupled capacities already take the ramping restrictions into 
account, the trade income under implicit auction also includes the ramping restrictions. To 
compare, I added column 6 where the trade flow was set to a constant 700 MWh to show 
how the fictional implicit revenues were calculated under the explicit auction regime. As we 
can see, the estimated implicit auction income overestimates the revenue, however, only by 
2600 Euros for these 24 hours.  
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Table 6 Ramping restrictions under real implicit auction: 02.02.2011 
Hour 
NO2-NL 
export 
coupled 
capacity 
MW 
NL-NO2 
import 
coupled 
capacity 
MW 
Price NO2 - 
APX 
EUR/MWh  
Trade income: 
coupled 
capacity*price 
difference 
Trade income, 
always 
700MW 
1 0 700 14.07 9849 9849 
2 0 700 16.96 11872 11872 
3 0 700 17.73 12411 12411 
4 0 700 17.37 12159 12159 
5 0 700 16.92 11844 11844 
6 0 700 13.15 9205 9205 
7 0 700 4.52 3164 3164 
8 0 100 -1.66 166 1162 
9 499 0 0.00 0 0 
10 700 0 1.31 917 917 
11 700 0 0.76 532 532 
12 700 0 3.32 2324 2324 
13 700 0 1.11 777 777 
14 209 0 1.05 219 735 
15 0 390 1.05 410 735 
16 0 700 0.27 189 189 
17 0 581 -0.13 75 91 
18 17 0 -0,.1 0 7 
19 500 0 1.41 705 987 
20 0 100 -0.80 80 560 
21 0 700 6.02 4214 4214 
22 0 700 11.53 8071 8071 
23 0 700 13.56 9492 9492 
24 0 700 17.27 12089 12089 
   
Total 110764 113386 
 
The implicit auction sets the price and transfer capacity at the same time, making the trade 
flow more likely to change with price than in explicit auction where the transfer capacity 
was auctioned before the price was known. I would therefore expect there to be more 
changes in the trade direction under implicit auction. Yet, as illustrated in Table 1, the flow 
on NorNed under implicit auction has mostly been towards Norway due to the cold weather 
and low reservoir levels. This leaves only a small timeframe to observe changes in flow 
direction.  
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Table 6 also shows another important point. Even under implicit auction it is possible to get 
adverse flows (marked in red). In hour 8 it seems clear that the ramping restrictions limit the 
amount of change in flow, and thereby create an hour with adverse flow. Without the 
ramping restriction, the flow could have changed rapidly enough to prevent it. Ramping 
restrictions do not however, account for all these cases. Possible explanations could be block 
bids, start- and stop costs or that the price difference is so small that the loss from ramping 
by shifting direction would more than offset the potential profit. This could also explain why 
500 MWh were exported from Norway in hour 9 when there was no price difference 
between the two markets. 
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8. Efficiency of explicit auction 
Implicit auction is expected to increase efficiency compared to the previous explicit auction 
as the price of electricity and the transfer capacity on the interconnectors is set at the same 
time in a single market. This will reduce the occurrence of adverse flows. After reading the 
article in Teknisk Ukeblad (Teknisk Ukeblad, 2011) where Bente Hagem said that the 
consumers in Norway and the Netherlands had lost about 30 million Euros due to the explicit 
auction, I sent an email to Statnett asking for some more information. Let us look at the data.  
8.1 Loss due to market mechanism 
The Statnett dataset covers the period from 12
th
 of May 2008 to 12
th
 of January 2011 and 
includes hourly data for the following variables: date, time, bought capacity, nominated 
capacity, available capacity, physical flow, prices in N02 and NO1 as well as at APX, and 
the auction prices of transfer capacity, thus providing sufficient figures for estimating 
income.  
Statnett provided me not only with the dataset, but also with their analysis of the explicit 
auction period. The results are rendered in Table 7. The actual income from the explicit 
auction amount to slightly less than 180 million Euros and the trade income that would have 
been achieved with an implicit auction form amounted to 205 million Euros. The difference 
is then 25 million Euros. This is the loss to the consumers in Norway and the Netherlands as 
a result of the explicit auction on NorNed. As Statnett and TenneT are equal partners in 
NorNed, half of this sum would then fall on each party.  
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Table 7 Statnett's analysis of the revenue difference between explicit and 
implicit auction (12.05.2008-12.01.2011) in Euros 
Statnett's 
analysis  
Sum auction income 
(explicit) in Euro 
Sum Trade income 
(implicit) in Euro 
2008 106 601 715 113 340 597 
2009 44 795 111 51 651 152 
2010 24 325 527 34 693 484 
2011 4 196 392 5 377 925 
Total 179 918 745 205 063 158 
   
Difference: 25 144 413 
 
 
However, when looking closer at the dataset used to come to this sum, the potential benefit 
of changing from explicit to implicit auction seems rather high.  
As discussed in chapter 7.2, the method here used to calculate the potential revenues for the 
alternative implicit auction on NorNed was in fact a bit too optimistic in terms of how much 
revenue it is possible to achieve. These calculations used the full available transmission 
capacity of the cable multiplied by the price difference (NO2-APX). The available 
transmission capacity is only reduced for maintenance or fall out of the cable. To compare, if 
the available transmission capacity had not been reduced at all, i.e. that there had been a 
constant trade of 700 MWh for the whole period of explicit auction, the revenues would have 
amounted to 248.2 million Euros.  
Statnett’s method of calculation of implicit revenue does not take into consideration the 
ramping restrictions, which leads to unrealistic high expectations for revenue generation 
under implicit auction. The ramping restrictions will be further discussed in the next section.  
8.2 The effect of ramping 
As the calculations above did not consider ramping, the trade income following from 
implicit auction was somewhat overestimated. My intention was to correctly estimate the 
corresponding trade income from implicit auction by correcting for the ramping restrictions. 
However, as mentioned in the introduction, the dataset was somewhat incomplete. I have 
tried to fill in the available capacity and prices where this was missing, as well as to align the 
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physical flow with the correct nominated capacity. Due to time restraints this has only been 
done up to January 2010, which leaves quite a room for improvement.  
The adjusted income from the actual explicit auction and the estimated implicit auction for 
2008 and 2009 are shown in Table 8. For the explicit auction, the difference between 
Statnett’s calculations and the auction income corrected for the missing values is not so 
large. However, looking at the estimated implicit revenues for 2008, the adjusted income is 
3.4 million Euros larger than Statnett’s estimation only for that year. If there are 
corresponding missing values in the rest of the dataset, it might be worth to adjust those 
calculations as well.  
Table 8 Adjusted income calculations (in Euros) 
Year 
Statnett's 
auction 
income 
(explicit) 
Statnett's 
Trade 
income 
(implicit) 
Corrected 
auction 
income 
(explicit) 
Corrected 
Trade 
income 
(implicit) 
Income 
Difference 
explicit 
Income 
Difference 
implicit 
2008 106 601 715 113 340 597 107 014 369 116 749 009 412 654 3 408 412 
2009 44 795 111 51 651 152 44 796 760 52 337 936 1 649 686 784 
 
Using these corrected numbers I continued to adjust the potential income from implicit 
auction for ramping restriction. The aim was to be able to compare the explicit and the 
implicit revenues. I adjusted the ATC that Statnett provided to the ramping restrictions, 
setting it to 300 MW the hour before and after a change in direction. Ramping restrictions 
also limit the start up after fallouts to 600 MW.  
The results are shown in Table 9. Adding the adjusted explicit auction revenue for all four 
years gives 180 million Euros. The adjusted estimates for what the income would have been 
in the same period amount to 209 million Euros. However, adjusting the ATC for ramping 
restrictions and calculating the income from those numbers, yields a lower answer: 204 
million Euros. This is the maximum possible trade income if the implicit auction mechanism 
had been used, adjusted for ramping.  
Looking at the same numbers that Statnett used in their analysis – only adjusted for the 
missing values – the potential loss due to market mechanism would then be adjusted trade 
income (implicit) less the adjusted auction income (explicit), which amounts to 28.8 million 
Euros, or about 4 million more than in Statnett’s analysis.  
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Comparing the adjusted income from the explicit auction to the maximum trade income 
adjusted for ramping, the potential loss due to market mechanism is 23.7 million Euros. This 
is then the real for what the Norwegian and Dutch consumers lost due to the explicit auction 
on NorNed from 2008 to 2011.  
The difference between the adjusted trade income (implicit) and the maximum trade income 
adjusted for ramping is the cost of ramping, and amounts to 5.2 million Euros. Compared to 
the potential loss due to market mechanism, i.e. the income difference between explicit and 
implicit auction without ramping adjustments, we find that ramping amounts to 18 percent of 
the loss.  
Table 9 Ramping adjusted income calculations (in Euros) 
Year 
Adjusted auction 
income (explicit) 
Adjusted trade 
income (implicit) 
Max. trade income, 
adjusted for ramping 
2008 107 014 369 116 749 009 115 181 589 
2009 44 796 760 52 337 936 50 060 260 
2010 24 325 527 34 693 484 33 376 559 
2011 4 196 392 5 377 925 5 377 925 
Total 180 333 048 209 158 354 203 996 332 
    
    Income difference explicit and implicit revenue 28 825 306 
Income difference explicit and adjusted implicit revenue 23 663 284 
Ramping     5 162 022 
 
In practice this means that Statnett overestimates the possible revenue stream from switching 
to implicit auction by 5.2 million Euros, which is the aggregate loss from ramping 
restrictions. As discussed in chapter 3, the ramping rules will not disappear with the 
transition from explicit to implicit auction. It is therefore important to get a clear idea of the 
both the practical and financial implications of ramping. But as we saw in chapter 7, the 
ramping rules have changed with the transition to implicit auction. According to Tore Granli 
in Statnett (2011), since the ramping restrictions are now included in the algorithms used by 
both EMCC and Nord Pool Spot to calculate the transmission capacity as well as the price of 
electricity, the results are more efficient. 
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By calculating the implicit revenues the way it was done and compare it to the explicit 
auction revenue, one is really comparing two different things. The reason is that the explicit 
auction revenue takes into account ramping restrictions, while the implicit revenues do not. 
To compare the two numbers therefore make the explicit auction mechanisms appear to be 
less profitable and more inefficient than it really is. However, there is no doubt that the 
transition from explicit to implicit auction does increase both efficiency and profitability for 
TenneT and Statnett.  
8.3 Alternatives to ramping 
A report by the Nordic Operations Development Group in (2010) evaluated alternatives to 
ramping. Compared to the alternatives, ramping restrictions is considered to be the best 
instrument to maintain system security.  
In the short run, however, the report states that there are three main alternatives to ramping, 
none of which seem particularly promising: 
 Counter trade where the TSOs sell electricity on the exporting side and buy on the 
importing side to reduce the flow on the interconnector. However, there are no 
practical and transparent procedures to counter trade available due to amongst other 
things lack of cost sharing mechanisms. Counter trade does not increase the overall 
efficiency of a power system compared to ramping restrictions; it will merely 
redistribute the costs and gains amongst the consumers, producers and TSOs. In 
addition, it might lead to strategic behaviour in the market which could lead to 
inefficiencies. 
 More automatic reserves to handle imbalances mean that more production capacity 
has to be kept outside of the market, which again the TSOs will have to pay for. 
Some of the reserves can then be used to counteract the inevitable imbalances in real 
time.  
 Better TSO control of changes in physical production as frequent changes in 
production and flow in fully loaded corridors in the grid increase the TSOs’ 
difficulties to maintain balance and frequency control. There are plans being 
developed to shorten the time span from hourly to quarterly production plans to 
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alleviate the challenge of system security, but this cannot solve the problem of 
system security by itself. 
In the longer run, the Nordic Operations Development Group has three suggestions: 
 Restrict the rate of change of physical productions and exchanges in the power 
systems: An agreement between the Nordic synchronous system and Continental 
European system of a 30 minutes period (15 minutes before and 15 minutes after 
each hour) where the shift has to take place would probably solve a large part of the 
ramping challenge. 
 Quarterly settlements in the Nordic area: Reduces the physical imbalance between 
production and consumption which means that the reserves can be reduced. As stated 
above, this will not solve the challenge, but it will reduce the impact. 
 Coordinated balancing of different synchronous areas: Frequency control is 
coordinated across two synchronous systems, so that frequency variations 
automatically change the direction of flow from the scheduled direction on the 
interconnector to alleviate the problem. However, this situation requires a very 
developed system of information exchange between the involved TSOs, new control 
systems and regulation on the HVDC interconnectors as well as financial agreements 
for compensation for activation of the reserve mechanism. Having all these things in 
place, it is probable that the ramping challenge will be largely solved.  
 
When Nordel
25
 introduced ramping restrictions on HVDC interconnectors in 2007, the long-
term goal (2010) was to be able to reduce ramping restrictions by introducing new balancing 
products (Nord Pool Spot, 2007). So far this has not happened. With the planned increase in 
interconnector capacity, not only from Norway, but from the whole Nordic region, this might 
put further strain the ramping challenge. As most of the interconnectors planned in Norway 
will be connected within the same price area (price area 2), this could intensify the problem 
in this area. It seems reasonable to question whether the new interconnectors would not 
warrant tighter ramping restrictions, at least until the NOD has developed the measures 
suggested for the longer run.  
                                                 
25 Former name for Nordic Operations Development Group 
 65 
9. Concluding remarks 
In this thesis I have discussed the differences between the explicit and implicit auction and 
the consequences this has had on the trade on NorNed. As shown in the analysis, the most 
important shortcoming of explicit auction is that it can lead to situations where the trade of 
electricity flows in the opposite direction of what the price difference between the two 
market areas indicate. In the period of explicit auction on NorNed, this happened around 
12.5 percent of the hours.  
In explicit auction there is more risk compared to the implicit auction as transmission 
capacity is bought before the price is set. This means that the participant cannot know 
whether he will make money on the trade until after he has already committed to paying for 
the transmission capacity. The option not use the bought capacity, however somewhat 
reduces the loss for the participants. 
The difference in risk between explicit and implicit auction is also reflected in the total 
auction revenues as the participants’ bids for transmission capacity in explicit auction may 
reflect the higher uncertainty.  
Statnett calculated what the revenues could have been if implicit auction had been used 
rather than explicit using the available transmission capacity multiplied by the price 
difference between Norway and the Netherlands. Comparing this number to the actual 
auction revenues from the explicit auction, there is a difference of about 25 million Euros 
that Statnett considers to be the loss due to explicit auction.  
However, the available transmission capacities used in these calculations do not include the 
ramping restrictions needed to maintain system stability. As the ramping rules are included 
in the explicit auction revenues, Statnett’s calculation in fact compared two different things. 
I extracted the costs related to ramping and filled in some missing data and found the 
difference between the corrected revenue for implicit auction and the auction income to be 
23 million Euros. The loss related to explicit auction is thus still significant, but not quite as 
large as Statnett calculated it to be.  
Ramping restrictions amounted for 5.2 million Euros in loss according to my calculations. 
The Nordic Operations Development Group (NOD) in ENTSO-E has evaluated several 
alternatives to ramping, but concluded that, as of today, ramping restrictions were the most 
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efficient method to ensure system security. With more interconnectors planned in the future, 
for example NorNed 2, Skagerak 4, Nord.Link and possibly NorEng, the need for ramping 
restrictions could increase in the future. Further research is needed to analyse whether the 
increase in interconnectors changes NOD’s conclusion. 
The transition to the implicit auction has significantly reduced inefficiencies compared to the 
explicit auction. As the inefficiencies of explicit auction are well-known, it is unlikely that 
there will be any new explicit auctions other than as a temporary solution.  
However, the implicit market mechanism on NorNed today – tight volume coupling – is also 
meant to be a temporary solution. According to Bente Hagem in Statnett’s Annual Report 
(2011) a new market mechanism – price coupling – will be in place by 2012. Price coupling 
on NorNed will further increase efficiency and the integration of the markets as both flow 
and price will be determined for the whole market area in one operation based on all 
information available.  This will however require complete harmonisation of matching and 
price rules between the power exchanges.   
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